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ABSTRACT
We show on an application to small-area statistics that efficient estimation is not
always conducive to good policy decisions because the established inferential pro-
cedures have no capacity to incorporate the priorities and preferences of the policy
makers and the related consequences of incorrect decisions. A method that ad-
dresses these deficiencies is described. We argue that elicitation of the perspectives
of the client (sponsor) and their quantification are essential elements of the analysis
because different estimators (decisions) are appropriate for different perspectives.
An example of planning an intervention in a developing country’s districts with
high rate of illiteracy is described. The example exposes the deficiencies of the
general concept of efficiency and shows that the criterion for the quality of an es-
timator has to be formulated specifically for the problem at hand. In the problem,
the established small-area estimators perform poorly because the minimum mean
squared error is an inappropriate criterion.
Key words: composition, empirical Bayes, expected loss, borrowing strength, ex-
ploiting similarity, shrinkage, small-area estimation.
1. Introduction
Survey methods have in the recent decades been greatly stimulated by the big-
budget departments of national governments, such as social security, health care,
education and employment, owing to their greater appreciation of the role of sta-
tistical information and inference in policy making. Developments in small-area
estimation have responded to the demand for greater detail about the (administra-
tive) divisions of a country, such as regions and districts. In a typical setting, a
national survey is conducted, collecting information about the key variables, such
as employment status, and an established set of background variables (age, sex, ed-
ucational level, marital status, and the like), and estimates related to a key variable
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are sought for each district. The districts are of varying sizes, and some of them
are represented in the survey by small samples that on their own are not sufficient
for estimating their key characteristics, usually percentages (e.g., the unemployment
rate), with any appreciable precision.
The main advance in small-area estimation is the exploitation of similarity, also
referred to as borrowing strength, in any aspect for which (auxiliary) data is avail-
able. Obvious examples of such data (and information) are values of the target vari-
able observed in the other districts of the country, the background variables recorded
in the survey, and information obtained from censuses and surveys. Somewhat less
appreciated is the potential of variables prima facie related to the target variable
and information from the previous years of the surveys in the same programme.
For estimating subpopulation characteristics (e.g., for minorities), other subpopula-
tions (or the complementary subpopulation) are often very effective auxiliaries. See
Longford (2005) for examples. In particular, insisting on having the values of aux-
iliary variables for the entire population is extremely restrictive (Elbers, Lanjouw
and Lanjouw, 2003).
In small-area estimation, as in other survey inference, efficient estimation is
generally regarded as superior. A lot of the theory is concerned with deriving es-
timators that are efficient, or nearly so, sometimes in uncongenial circumstances,
using models known not to be valid. Robust estimation is therefore regarded as
invaluable. Estimation of standard errors of these estimators is also an important
preoccupation. This research implies, often without a clinical statement to that ef-
fect, that the estimates obtained are best suited for a policy related to the target
variable and that it will be well informed by efficient small-area estimators. The
statistical analysis is concluded by the presentation of the estimates and the asso-
ciated standard errors, and the remainder of the analysis is left to be dealt with by
the policy maker. We show by example that this is a poor strategy and argue that
the analytical skills of a statistician and the insight and other qualities of the policy
maker have to be integrated much more closely.
The core of the problem is that the consequences of the (estimation) errors made
have to be taken into account because they are in substantial discord with the default
assumption of the (symmetric) quadratic loss. These consequences are difficult to
elicit from experts and to quantify them, but that is hardly an excuse for applying
methods that assume a particular structure of such consequences, especially when
the assumed structure is in obvious discord with the client’s perception. The analyst
may not be aware of the consequences and of their relevance, and therefore would
STATISTICS IN TRANSITION new series, Spring 2015 67
not communicate the (default) assumptions to the client. It is essential to sensitise
the client to this issue because the solution to the problem is statistical, and there
is a danger that when the client becomes aware of the issue he or she will seek a
second-rate ad hoc solution not integrated with the original (incomplete) analysis.
In the next section, we outline the policy planned in an application and describe
a survey that is intended to inform the policy. The policy is related to combating
illiteracy in the districts of a developing country. Illiteracy is regarded as a major
barrier to gaining employment and to economic development in general, but also
to the spread of government information and, admittedly, of the governing party’s
political propaganda as well. In Section 3, we review the established methods for
small-area estimation and highlight their deficiency which is then addressed in Sec-
tion 4 by the proposed estimator, called policy-related. In Section 5, we compare
by simulations the implementations of the policy using three estimators:
• direct estimators that no one would recommend (for small districts);
• composite (empirical Bayes) estimators that are generally regarded as supe-
rior;
• policy-related estimators constructed with the intent to minimise the total ex-
pected loss.
We show that for a wide range of perspectives and priorities of the decision maker
the policy-related estimator is far superior to the other two estimators. The con-
cluding section discusses the implications of this result on how small-area analysis
should be conducted, and extends them to some general principles, including how
official statistical institutes should operate.
Direct estimators use no auxiliary information; they are based only on the data
for the target variable and the region concerned. Often they are standard survey-
methods estimators (see, e.g., Särndal, Bengtsson and Wretman, 1992) restricted to
the region. Empirical Bayes estimators exploit auxiliary information by means of a
two-level regression model (Goldstein, 2002; Rao, 2003) and composite estimators
(Longford, 1999 and 2005) combine direct and auxiliary estimators (or exact quan-
tities) without a reference to a model. The policy-related estimator is developed in
Longford (2013, Chapter 7, and 2015), where some technical details omitted from
this article can be found. The method exploits auxiliary information, but requires
also input about the consequences (ramifications) of the errors that may be commit-
ted. These errors are:
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• false negative: failure to apply an intervention when it should have been ap-
plied;
• false positive: applying the intervention when it is not necessary.
Our interest is in settings in which these consequences are uneven. In the example of
combating endemic illiteracy, a false negative has much more serious consequences
(greater losses) than a false positive. Empirical Bayes methods and, more generally,
methods that aim to minimize the mean squared error (MSE), are oblivious to such
consequences.
Similar issues arise in medical screening (Longford, 2013, Chapter 6), where
a false positive (incorrect labelling as diseased) is regarded as less serious an error
than a false negative (failure to discover the disease), in (production) quality con-
trol, where a false claim of satisfying a standard is much more costly (in the long
term) than the pursuit of further (unessential) improvements when the standard has
already been achieved, and in the operation of warning systems (for epidemics, nat-
ural disasters, military or terrorist attacks, and the like), where false warnings may
erode the credibility of the system, but a failure to warn is an unmitigated disaster.
2. Illiteracy in the districts of a country
We consider a developing country with an adult population (aged 16 or over) ap-
proaching 40 million and adult illiteracy rate of about 18%. The country has 72
districts, of population sizes (numbers of adults) varying from 50 000 to 1.8 million
(the capital). Illiteracy tends to be more prevalent in rural districts. Its rates are
smaller in the most populous districts which are mostly urban (large cities and their
environs). However, some less populous districts are formed by single (smaller)
towns and cities, and there the illiteracy rates tend to be smaller. Some of these
towns are satellites of larger cities.
The Ministry of Education has appropriated funds for conducting a survey to
study the illiteracy rate in the country. The results would then be used for imple-
menting a particular policy aimed at the districts with illiteracy rates higher than
25%. The survey has several sponsors and subscribers with purposes different from
small-area estimation, and so a compromise stratified sampling design is imple-
mented, with the districts as the strata. Some clustering is applied within the strata,
which is of marginal interest for our purposes, and its details are omitted. It is im-
possible to ensure that each stratum (district) would have a sample size sufficient
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for reliable direct estimation of its illiteracy rate.
Denote by θd the rate of illiteracy in district d = 1, . . . ,D, and by θˆd and θ˜d
the respective direct and composite estimators of θd . The composite estimator is
defined as the convex combination of the direct and (overall) national estimator,
(1−bd) θˆd +bd θˆ , (1)
where the coefficient bd = 1/(1+ndω) involves the ratioω =σ2B/σ2 of the between-
and within-stratum variances and nd is the sample size of the stratum. When the
sampling weights are not constant within strata, nd has to be replaced by the ef-
fective sample size. The variance σ2 is estimated by pooling the within-district
estimates of the variance and σ2B is estimated by moment matching applied to the
sum-of-squares statistic ∑d(θˆd− θˆ)2.
As part of the policy, an intervention is designed and planned to be applied in
districts in which θd > 0.25. We assume that it will be applied to districts with
θˆd > 0.25 or θ˜d > 0.25, or to districts that satisfy this inequality for a different es-
timator. At the beginning of the author’s involvement, all parties involved agreed
that the composite estimator θ˜d should be used. The Research Department of the
Ministry agreed that a simulation study would be conducted, mainly to assess the
potential problems with districts that have extreme rates of illiteracy. The related
methodological issue is discussed in Longford (2007), and it concerns mainly es-
timation of the standard errors and the claim that empirical Bayes and composite
estimators are superior to direct estimators for every district. Also, the funding for
the survey and the intervention come from the same budget, and so its split for
the survey (data collection and analysis) and policy implementation was negotiated
extensively, until it was agreed that a simulation study would inform this issue.
The simulation study, and the detailed discussion of its set-up, including the
information on which it would be based, as well as the arguments about how to
evaluate the results, brought to the fore the purpose of the survey, namely, allocation
of funds to the districts. Here the established criterion of minimum MSE turned out
to be irrelevant because in the Ministry’s perspective, the evaluation should focus on
the two types of error (false negative and false positive) in classifying the districts
as
• deserving the intervention (θd > 0.25), and
• not deserving the intervention (θd < 0.25).
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At first, this might suggest that hypothesis testing (HT) should be applied. How-
ever, this was also dismissed after a set of simulations when it became clear that HT
is oblivious to the consequences of the two kinds of error. The following example
disqualifies HT from almost any problem in which we have to decide how to pro-
ceed; as if the (null) hypothesis were valid, or not. Suppose incorrect omission of a
district from intervention is five times as serious an error as incorrect inclusion. By
a hypothesis test, with the conventional level of significance of α = 0.05, we would
come to a particular decision. Next, suppose incorrect omission is 50 times more
serious than incorrect inclusion. With conventional statistical tools, and conven-
tional operational mindset, we would apply the same hypothesis test, and come to
the same decision. No procedure that always comes to the same conclusion in these
two settings could possibly be appropriate. A decision (choice between two com-
plementary options) is poorly founded if it is not influenced by the consequences of
the two kinds of incorrect choices, unless the decision is always correct (or always
incorrect) and entails no uncertainty. In the general problem of estimation, a sim-
ilar dismissing argument is easy to formulate. The consequences of the errors that
are committed in estimation have to be an important factor in how an estimator is
constructed. Ignoring them is a licence for making poor decisions and, ultimately,
rendering the statistical analysis irrelevant.
Eliciting information about the consequences of errors is, unfortunately, not a
mainstream statistical activity. In practice, it can be surprisingly contentious, be-
cause many clients believe that ‘it is all in the data’, and the analyst’s task is to
process the data and deliver an unambiguous verdict. Also, a client may suspect
that the analyst wants to elicit the client’s perspective, priorities and goals, merely
to fix up the results so as to superficially please the client, or to obtain confidential
information that would later be disclosed to the client’s detriment. In the politi-
cal and civil-service sphere, the value of information is well appreciated, but often
leads to the practice of divulging it on a strictly need-to-know basis. This involves
liberally placed controls and requirements for approvals (hurdles) across the layers
of management that hinder and sometimes entirely disable the process of informing
the statistical analysis. A change in the perspectives and priorities may appear as
an embarrassment to the client. However, it is a responsible act when it responds
appropriately to new information and circumstances. Elicitation is more commonly
considered for prior distributions in Bayesian estimation (Garthwaite, Kadane and
O’Hagan, 2005). The same principles apply to elicitation in our context, although
much less of the experience is recorded in the literature.
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An important element of elicitation is to put the clients (or experts) at ease by not
rushing them to any quick decisions (or an uneasy consensus), and explaining that
they are not expected to have answers ready at a moment’s notice. In the example of
combating illiteracy, the key question relates to the so-called penalty ratio R which
quantifies how many times more costly is an error of one kind than of the other.
There is no need to conclude with a single value R. It is more constructive to set (or
declare) a plausible range of values of R. The key property of such a range is that
any value outside it can be ruled out—that the client is satisfied that such a value is
not realistic. Of course, it is advantageous to have as narrow a plausible range as
possible, but its plausibility is an imperative. The wider the range, the greater the
threat of an inferential impasse, when both decisions are plausible; one for certain
plausible values of R and the other for the complement.
The rationale for reflecting in inferential statements different perspectives and
priorities is hinted by Shen and Louis (1998). They coined the term ‘triple-goal
estimator’ to highlight the need for different estimators for three distinct purposes
in small-area estimation: estimating each district’s population quantity, ranking the
districts according to this quantity, and estimating the district-level distribution of
these quantities. A compact summary of their conclusion is that efficiency and
unbiasedness (of an estimator) are fragile properties. Fragility refers to the fact that
these properties are not maintained by non-linear transformations, and even less
so by some discontinuous ones, such as assessing whether a parameter is greater
or smaller than a set threshold. We can paraphrase these conclusions by saying that
optimality of an estimator is conditioned on the scale used for the error in estimation.
By the same token, an estimator with minimum MSE may be far from optimal with
a distinctly asymmetric loss function. Loss function is as important an input and has
a similar nature as (informative) prior distribution in Bayesian analysis, where it is
taken for granted that different priors lead to different posteriors and conclusions
based on them. On this account, we have to dismiss the idea that the results of
a respectable analysis, even in a frequentist paradigm, have to be ‘objective’ and
applicable to a wide range of perspectives. Instead, they have to be client-specific,
that is, responsive and sensitive to the client’s perspective and value judgements.
3. Shrinkage estimation
Empirical Bayes estimators (Robbins, 1995; Carlin and Louis, 2000) are a general
example of shrinkage estimators. Composite estimators (Longford, 1999) are also
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shrinkage estimators; in fact, they apply shrinkage directly, without the intermedi-
ation of a model, and thus absolve the analyst from the responsibilities related to
the validity of the model, including the distributional assumptions. In small-area
estimation, this feature is important because the analysts rarely have the freedom
to choose what auxiliary information will be used; they have to operate with what
is available and can neither present an excuse nor apportion the blame to anybody
when the model is assessed not to fit well.
Shrinkage estimators pull a direct estimator θˆd for district d toward a (national)
focus θˆ ; see equation (1). The amount of shrinkage (the strength of the pull) de-
pends on the balance of the sampling variance of θˆd , equal to σ2/nd in the simplest
setting, and the district level variance σ2B = vard(θd). The latter variance is defined
for the districts and is not related to sampling; it is a population quantity. If σ2B is
very small, then the shrinkage is strong because the districts are very similar and the
national estimator θˆ is very useful for every district. In contrast, if σ2B is very large,
much less shrinkage takes place because θ may be far away from θd , and therefore
θˆ a poor estimator of θd ; this is the case for a substantial fraction of the districts.
Further, more shrinkage takes place for small districts (districts with large sampling
variance of θˆd) and less for districts with more precise estimators θˆd .
Although this interpretation applies only to the simplest form of (univariate)
shrinkage estimation, it offers some insights as to why it may be poorly suited for
the Ministry’s task. If a false positive has less serious consequences than a false
negative then we should focus on the deserving districts, for which only errors of
the former type are possible. In our example, these districts are in a minority because
the threshold of T = 25% is far greater than the national rate of about 18%. Direct
estimation for the deserving districts will result in an error if the estimation error is
negative and θˆd < 0.25 < θd . Positive or small negative estimation errors have no
consequences because then both θˆd and θd exceed the threshold. The likelihood that
θˆd is close to the national rate, θ
.
= 0.18, is quite small for most deserving districts,
because an error smaller than (more negative than) −0.07 is quite rare.
Shrinkage applied to the direct estimator in (1) pulls it toward the national rate,
and therefore reduces it for nearly all deserving districts. As an aside, note that this
implies that empirical Bayes estimation for a deserving district is biased, contrary to
the acronym EBLUP (empirical Bayes linear unbiased predictor) used in the context
of hierarchical linear models. There may be deserving districts with θˆd > T > θ˜d ,
for which direct estimation would lead to the appropriate decision (intervention),
but the shrinkage estimation would yield the inappropriate decision. The opposite,
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θˆd <T < θ˜d , is less likely to happen, because the focus of shrinkage is θˆ , an efficient
estimator of θ , and θ is much smaller than T . Thus, efficient estimation contradicts
good policy implementation. This is in accord with a clinical proposal described
in Longford (2013, Chapter 7), in which shrinkage is applied, but with a different
focus, and to an extent different from the empirical Bayes shrinkage.
4. Policy-related estimation
Before describing the proposed estimator, we give a minimum background to de-
cision theory, which motivates it. Suppose our target is a quantity (parameter) ν ,
and let νˆ be an estimator of ν . The estimator is unlikely to be without error;
∆ν = νˆ − ν 6= 0. The conventional criterion for ‘good’ (efficient) estimation, the
MSE, assigns the cost of ∆ν2 = (νˆ − ν)2, and the efficient estimator is defined as
the one that minimises the expectation E(∆ν2).
Suppose the cost is not symmetric. A simple adaptation of MSE is that the cost
is (νˆ−ν)2 if νˆ > ν , but it is R(νˆ−ν)2 if νˆ < ν . That is, given a fixed absolute error
|∆ν |, understatement is R times more costly than overstatement. The penalty ratio
R is positive, but may be smaller than unity. No generality is lost by having a factor
(R) with only one of the squared errors, because multiplying both error functions
by the same constant does not alter the nature of the costs; only their relative size
matters, and it is very convenient that their ratio is a constant (R). An estimator may
be optimal for R= 1, that is, for MSE as the criterion, but then it is not optimal for
R= 10, nor for R= 0.1.
Further, suppose we are not interested in the value of ν as such, but merely
want to establish whether ν is greater or smaller than a threshold T . In this setting,
estimation is associated with no error if νˆ and ν are on the same side of T—if both
νˆ and ν are greater than T , or both are smaller. Suppose one unit of loss is incurred
if ν < T but νˆ > T (incorrect inclusion, in the context of our study) and R units are
lost if ν > T but νˆ < T (incorrect omission).
This setting resembles HT, but if we wanted to apply it we would not know
which case (T ≤ 0.25 or T ≥ 0.25) to declare as the hypothesis and which as the
alternative. Even if we resolved this issue, we would not know how to act when the
hypothesis is not rejected because in that case the hypothesis has not been accepted,
merely we would have failed to find evidence against it. On the one hand, we are
well aware of this; on the other hand, we liberally abuse this wisdom because the
correct conclusion that we are ignorant about the relation of ν and T is unacceptable.
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A hypothesis test can provide evidence for its alternative, by concluding that there
is a probabilistic contradiction with the hypothesis. But in the absence of such a
contradiction, it does not provide any evidence for the hypothesis. Continuing the
analysis, a business agenda, or any other plan as if the hypothesis were valid, where
there is no support for it, is a common logical inconsistency that does no favours to
the image of any scientist.
In the decision-theoretical approach (Lindley, 1985; DeGroot, 2004), we evalu-
ate the expected loss with the two options we have, to conclude A, that ν < T , or
B, that ν > T , and choose the option that is associated with smaller expected loss.
The evaluations are somewhat more complex than in HT, but they are a small price
to pay for better allocation of our own money (assuming that we all are taxpayers)
or, in general, for tailoring the solution closer to the clients’ perspective, priorities
and goals.
The policy-related estimator is developed from the following considerations.
Let
θ˜ ∗d = (1−bd) θˆd +bdFd , (2)
where bd is the shrinkage coefficient and Fd is the focus of shrinkage, set separately
for each district. In empirical Bayes and composite estimation, Fd ≡ θˆ ; see (1). In
our problem, one might contemplate Fd ≡ T . Both proposals lead to poor solutions.
The coefficients bd and Fd are determined by two conditions:
• equilibrium at T : the choice between options A and B is immaterial for a
district with θd = T ;
• minimum MSE.
The solution is derived in the Appendix.
The second condition is somewhat out of line with our general arguments, and
is included to obtain a unique solution that is tractable. Thus, our proposal is not
optimal; we have only empirical evidence that it is far superior to both direct and
composite estimation. Further, decisions based on composite estimation are poorer
than on direct estimation.
5. Simulations
For a simulation study, we form a computer version of the country, with its districts
and within-district rates of illiteracy. We define a sampling design: stratified sim-
ple random sampling with the districts as the strata and sampling fractions slightly
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greater in the smallest districts than in the largest, with some variation to make
the setting more realistic. The overall sample size is 20 000, and the average within-
district sample sizes are in the range 21 – 1030. In the sampling design, these sample
sizes are not fixed and involve some moderate randomness. The population rates of
illiteracy within the districts are in the range 2 – 29%, set by a random process in
which some prior information is used. These rates are fixed across replications. The
rates are smaller in the largest and some of the smallest districts, and are highest for
a few mid-size districts. The population is fixed (not altered) in the replications of a
simulation study; the sampling process is the sole source of randomness. However,
we conduct a large number of simulation studies, with different populations that are
plausible in the considered setting, to check that the findings are replicated across
studies.
A replication of the simulation comprises drawing a sample from the (fixed, ar-
tificially generated) population, and applying the three estimators, direct (D), com-
posite (C) and policy-related (P). The errors of the two kinds are then summarised
for each estimator (applied in 72 districts) and the losses added up. The population
size of a district is reflected in these summaries by multiplying the loss, when an
error in classifying the district is committed, by its population size (in millions).
From M = 1000 replications, we obtain 1000 triplets of losses and compare their
averages. This exercise is repeated for several values of R, which influence only the
policy-related estimator; the direct and composite estimators do not depend on R.
However, R is a factor in evaluating the average loss even for the direct and compos-
ite estimators. More detail can be obtained by evaluating the average losses within
the two groups of districts: those deserving the intervention (15 districts) and the
complement (57 districts).
Table 1 presents the results of one set of 1000 replications. For each replication,
we record the numbers of districts with errors of the two kinds, the total popula-
tion in them and the total of the losses scaled by the district-level population sizes.
These summaries are evaluated for the three estimators and several penalty ratios R,
indicated at the left-hand margin. For example, for R = 10, the policy-related es-
timator (P) generates false negatives (F–) for 1.484 districts on average (out of 15)
and false positives (F+) for 12.346 districts (out of 57), that is, 13.830 in total. Their
respective populations (numbers of adults) are 0.278 and 4.419 million on average,
4.697 million in total. Judging by these two totals, the policy-related estimator is
inferior to both the direct and composite estimators, which have errors in approx-
imately 4.4+ 5.3 = 9.7 and 7.4+ 2.4 = 9.8 districts, respectively, both involving
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only 2.9 million adults. However, on the criterion of expected loss, the direct and
composite estimators are far inferior to the policy-related estimator. The former two
have expected losses 0.495 and 0.711, respectively, whereas the expected loss of
the policy-related estimator is only 0.283. The policy-related estimator has greater
expected loss on false positives, but the other estimators have excessive expected
losses on false negatives.
Table 1: The average number of districts, population and the loss associated with
incorrect decisions; 1000 replications.
Districts Population Loss
R Estimator F– F+ F– F+ F– F+ Total
1 P 4.380 5.312 1.035 1.923 0.040 0.057 0.097
D 4.395 5.295 1.029 1.899 0.043 0.062 0.105
C 7.387 2.447 1.649 1.247 0.068 0.029 0.097
5 P 1.926 10.072 0.418 3.581 0.077 0.139 0.216
D 4.395 5.295 1.029 1.899 0.217 0.062 0.279
C 7.387 2.447 1.649 1.247 0.341 0.029 0.370
10 P 1.484 12.346 0.278 4.419 0.097 0.186 0.283
D 4.395 5.295 1.029 1.899 0.433 0.062 0.495
C 7.387 2.447 1.649 1.247 0.682 0.029 0.711
25 P 0.704 15.162 0.138 5.532 0.123 0.256 0.379
D 4.395 5.295 1.029 1.899 1.083 0.062 1.145
C 7.387 2.447 1.649 1.247 1.705 0.029 1.734
50 P 0.606 17.314 0.102 6.414 0.162 0.317 0.479
D 4.395 5.295 1.029 1.899 2.165 0.062 2.227
C 7.387 2.447 1.649 1.247 3.410 0.029 3.439
Notes: The estimators are: P: policy-related; D: direct; C: composite. The components of
loss are: F–: false negative; F+: false positive.
For greater penalty ratios R, the expected loss of the policy-related estimator is
greater, but for the other two estimators it increases at a much faster rate. For R= 50,
their expected losses are 0.47, 2.23 and 3.44. For R = 1, the policy-related and
composite estimators have the same expected loss, 0.097, and the direct estimator
has a slightly higher expected loss, 0.105. However, even for slightly higher R, the
policy-related estimator has the smallest expected loss, followed by the direct and
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composite estimators. Note that R = 1 is not equivalent to MSE, because no loss
is incurred when the appropriate decision is made, even when the estimate differs
from the target substantially, so long as it is in the direction in which the decision is
not altered.
In the implementation in the statistical language for computing and graphics R
(R Core Development Team, 2012), such a simulation takes about 10 seconds, and
so a wide variety of settings can be explored. In some situations, fewer than 1000
replications would suffice for comparisons with a high level of certainty, but the
saving in computing is negligible. The key to efficient processing of the results
is a partially automated assessment of the results and their compact tabular and
graphical presentation.
In particular, the simulations can be re-run with different sample sizes, to ex-
plore whether the Ministry’s funds could be allocated to the conduct of the survey
and the implementation of the programme more effectively. A greater sample size
requires higher expenditure, but the allocation of the remainder is then associated
with smaller expected losses. It turns out that a sample size around n= 35000 would
lead to a near-optimal split of the resources, although the calculation involved is
based on some further assumptions which make some of the existing assumptions
more onerous.
The issue of possibly insufficient funds can be explored similarly. Although it
uncovers some weaknesses of the policy-related estimator, it remains far superior
to its established competitors. The problem is that by erring on the side of inappro-
priate inclusion in the programme, the expenditure on its implementation increases,
and the awards to the selected districts have to be reduced.
The composite and policy-related estimators have their multivariate versions in
which auxiliary information from other variables is exploited. In further simula-
tions, we generated such information as the same survey from the previous year.
The bivariate composite estimator has substantially smaller expected loss than the
univariate composite estimator, but it is still inferior in some settings to the direct
estimator. The improvement of the policy-related estimator, based on a multivariate
version of the shrinkage in equation (2), is somewhat more modest, but it remains
far superior to the direct and composite estimators, except for R very close to unity,
such as R= 1.05. Even when we get the value of R wrong, say by 50% in either di-
rection, that is, we conduct the estimation with R, but evaluate the losses with 1.5R
or R/1.5, the policy-related estimator is superior to the direct estimator, although
the expected losses are appreciably greater than they would be with the assumed
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value of R. Thus, a modicum of uncertainty about R is acceptable, but there are
obvious rewards for its more precise specification by a narrower plausible range.
In summary, Table 1 shows that no single estimator or method is superior by all
criteria, so it is essential to specify the criterion that best describes the perspective
and priorities of the client. The penalty ratio R is a key quantity in this regard. The
policy-related estimation allows some leeway, and it suffices to declare a range of
plausible values of R. In the application, this range was set to (20,30), and the
survey design was based on R= 25. In more detailed exploration of the results, we
may find strong points of the composite estimator but on the principal criterion of
minimum expected loss it is a total failure; it is inferior even to the direct estimator.
6. Analysts and clients
National statistical institutes and their principal clients, the national government de-
partments and agencies, have over the recent decades negotiated a code of conduct
that would ensure the efficient functioning of the institutes without the client ex-
ercising any undue influence on the outcomes of the assigned tasks. Transparency
and unbiasedness of the institutes, sometimes interpreted as absence of any political
influence, are highly prized by the public and are generally regarded as essential
elements of the proper use of statistics by government agencies. This mode of op-
eration is appropriate for the production of inferential statements that are effective
without any uncertainty, such as national unemployment rates (based on national
Labour Force Surveys), consumer price indices, and the like.
Our example of planning an intervention in the districts, for which the uncer-
tainty about key quantities is nontrivial and has to be reckoned with, indicates that
such a detached mode of cooperation between the client and the analyst is not con-
ducive to good practice of statistics. Much closer cooperation and integration of
the two sets of activities, analytical and decision making, is required. The process
of elicitation implies such an integration, even though it is contrary to the current
trends in which transparent detachment of the two parties is paramount. The analyst
has to be privy to the details of how the estimates or other inferential statements
are going to be applied, and under what conditions, to actually choose an appro-
priate estimator and, more generally, a format of the inferential statement and the
assessment of its quality (the expected loss).
The argument that the client could deal with the decision-theoretical aspects
of the inferential task without the analyst’s assistance does not hold water. These
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evaluations entail nontrivial optimisation that is firmly in the remit of computational
statistics, and for which the national institutes are, or should be, equipped much
better than the client. These evaluations cannot be replaced by postprocessing the
results obtained by established methods and presented in a standard format.
We see the resolution of this problem in altering the professional ethos in statis-
tics and bringing it much closer to the standard of the (corporate) legal profession.
Their standard of ‘representing the best interests of the client’ should be translated
to the statistical profession as
representing the best interests as regards data and information, their
collection and all intermediate processes leading to decisions based on
them.
Transparency is not disregarded in this process, because the loss functions, the quan-
tified versions of the government priorities and perspectives, can and should be de-
clared openly, as a matter of course by a transparent government. Uncertainty about
them is not necessarily a sign of poor management or lack of control over the pro-
cesses in the remit of the client (the government). On the contrary, it may be an
indication of its integrity. Denial of such uncertainty is a sign of poor understand-
ing of its relevance in statistical inference, sometimes combined with misplaced
concerns about the false image of the government as an omniscient body.
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Appendix
This appendix derives the policy-related estimator. Suppose θˆd is normally dis-
tributed with expectation γd and variance ν2d ; θˆd may be biased for θd . Denote
z˜ = (γd − T )/νd and z˜† = (γd − θd)/νd . We use φ and Φ for the density and the
distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
For the piecewise constant loss, the expected losses for the false positives (when
θd < T ) and false negatives (when θd > T ) are
Q+ =
1
νd
∫ +∞
T
φ
(
y− γd
νd
)
dy = Φ(z˜d)
Q− =
R
νd
∫ T
−∞
φ
(
y− γd
νd
)
dy = R{1−Φ(z˜d)} ,
respectively. The corresponding identities for the piecewise quadratic loss function
are
Q+ =
1
νd
∫ +∞
T
(y−θd)2 φ
(
y− γd
νd
)
dy
= ν2d
{(
1+ z˜†2d
)
Φ(z˜d) +
(
2z˜†d− z˜d
)
φ(z˜d)
}
Q− =
R
νd
∫ T
−∞
(y−θd)2 φ
(
y− γd
νd
)
dy
= Rν2d
[(
1+ z˜†2d
)
{1−Φ(z˜d)} −
(
2z˜†d− z˜d
)
φ(z˜d)
}
.
These identities are obtained by integration by parts. Under the condition of equi-
librium at T , z˜d = z˜
†
d , and we have the equations
Φ(z˜d) =
R
R+1
(R+1)
{(
1+ z˜2d
)
Φ(z˜d)+ z˜d φ(z˜d)
}
= R
(
1+ z˜2d
)
for the respective constant and quadratic loss. The former equation has an explicit
solution for z˜d , while the latter is solved by the Newton method. Denote the solution
of the relevant equation by z˜∗d . The results in Table 1 are based on the quadratic loss.
The MSE of θ˜d is
MSE
(
θ˜d ;θd
)
= (1−bd)2 ν2d +b2d (Fd−θd)2 .
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We replace the square (Fd−θd)2 by its average over the districts d, to eliminate the
target θd . We refer to this operation as averaging. It results in the identity
aMSE
(
θ˜d ;θd
)
= (1−bd)2 ν2d +b2d
{
σ2B +(Fd−θ)2
}
.
Equilibrium at θd = T is satisfied when
Fd = T +
|1−bd |
bd
z˜∗dνd ;
then the estimator is
θ˜d = (1−bd) θˆd +bdT + z˜∗d |1−bd |νd
and its aMSE is
aMSE
(
θ˜d ;θd
)
= (1−bd)2
(
1+ z˜∗2d
)
ν2d +b
2
d
{
σ2B +(T −θ)2
}
+2bd |1−bd | (T −θ)z˜∗dνd .
This quadratic function of bd attains an extreme when
b∗d =
ν2d
(
1+ z˜∗2d
)− sign(1−b∗d) (T −θ)z˜∗dνd
ν2d +σ
2
B +
{
z˜∗dνd− sign
(
1−b∗d
)
(T −θ)}2 ,
and it can be shown that one of the two solutions is the unique minimum. For further
details, see Longford (2015).
